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PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION:
INTERPRETING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
JAY E. GRENIG*
A. Introduction I. BASIC CONCEPTS
Contract interpretation requires a determination of just what the
parties meant when they adopted certain language or of how the parties
would have wanted their language to be applied in specific cir-
cumstances.' The interpretive process involves giving meaning to the
words used by the parties in their collective bargaining agreement.2
Ideally, contract interpretation would result in a determination of
a meaning corresponding exactly with what both parties in fact had in
mind. Pointing out that this ideal is seldom attainable, Prof. Murray
wrote:
In the first place, it is impossible to know exactly what the
parties did have in mind. Moreover, even if this could be deter-
mined, it may be doubted whether very many cases would be
found in which both parties did have exactly the same things
in mind. The best we can do is to approximate that ideal by
adopting as a goal something that is more nearly possible of at-
tainment. That goal, must, however, be fair to both parties to
the contract.
3
A number of authorities assert that the principles of contract and
statutory interpretation, with necessary modifications, can be of
assistance in interpreting collective bargaining agreements.' Others con-
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.A., 1966, Willamette
University; J.D., 1971, Hastings College of the Law, University of California. This article
is based on a chapter written by the author for a treatise on labor and employment ar-
bitration to be published by Matthew-Bender.
1. D. Nolan, Arbitration Law and Practice 162 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Nolan).
2. Kramer, External Law and the Interpretive Process, Proceedings of the Thirty-
Eighth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 149 (1986) [hereinafter cited
as Kramer].
3. J. Murray, Murray on Contracts: A Revision of Grismore on Contracts, S 111,
at 243 (1974).
4. P. Prasow & E. Peters, Arbitration and Collective Bargaining: Conflict Resolu-
tion in Labor Relations 86 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Prasow & Peters]; A. Zack
& R. Bloch, Labor Agreement in Negotiation and Arbitration 5 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Zack & Bloch]; 0. Fairweather, Practice and Procedure in Labor Arbitration 199 (2d
ed. 1983); F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 344 (4th ed. 1985) [hereinafter
cited as Elkouri] ("lit should be recognized that all written instruments, constitutions,
statutes, and contracts are interpreted by the same general principles .... "); Nolan, supra
note 1, at 162. Compare Ahner, Arbitration: A Management View, Proceedings of the
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tend the principles of interpretation do not apply to collective bargain-
ing agreements.' Prof. Cox, for example, has rejected any attempt to
construct parallels between the collective bargaining agreement and con-
tracts used in the commercial world.'
Despite the concerns of some arbitrators, over the years many ar-
bitrators have looked to the principles of interpretation for guidance
in interpreting collective bargaining agreements.7 The principles of con-
tract and statutory interpretation serve as guides and are not used as
rigid or undeviating rules to be followed as methodically as though labor
relations were an exact science The person interpreting a collective
bargaining agreement must rely on his or her total background of ex-
perience and expertise in the collective bargaining process with due
regard to the relationship of the parties and their presentations in order
to provide as practical and realistic an interpretation as is possible.' Con-
tract language cannot be viewed or construed in a vacuum, devoid of
the background of negotiations and the circumstances and conditions
leading up to the ultimate agreement. ' An arbitrator should not, through
a highly technical interpretation of contract language, impose upon the
parties conditions that were never agreed to." A true understanding
Eleventh Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 76, 84 (1958) [hereinafer cited
as Abner] ("[Hiistoric principles of construction that were elaborated for contracts usual-
ly specific and limited are to be applied only with appropriate modification and insight
to the labor agreement that is essentially an accord stabilizing an employment
relationship.").
5. Garrett, The Interpretive Process: Myths and Reality, Proceedings of the Thirty-
Eighth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 121, 141-43 (1986) [hereinafter
cited as Garrett]; Mueller, The Law of Contracts-Changing Legal Environment, Proceedings
of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 204, 206-07, 209
(1978); Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, Proceedings of the Fifteenth An-
nual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 8, 11 (1962).
6. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 605 (1956). See
also Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 385 U.S.
157, 161 (1966) (A collective bargaining agreement "is not an ordinary contract for the
purchase of goods and services, nor is it governed by the same old common-law concepts
which control such private contracts.").
7. Elkouri, supra note 4, at 345; Kramer, supra, at 158. See Tri-County Metro
Transp. Dist., 68 LA 1369, 1370-71 (Tilbury 1977), for an extensive list of principles of
statutory interpretation and cases applying them.
8. Prasow & Peters, supra note 4, at 86.
9. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 143-44.
10. Columbus Foundries, Inc., 82 LA 1329, 1332 (Statham 198 (1973)).
[Vol. 16:31
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of the collective bargaining agreement may be gained only by giving
careful attention to the function it was intended to perform. 2
B. Intent and Purpose
The primary goal of contract interpretation is to determine the
mutual intent of the parties. 3 Many arbitration awards considering issues
of contract interpretation are written in the context of the intent of
the parties."' The principle of considering the parties' intent is based
on the assumption that there is an obligation to construe collective
bargaining parties' agreements so that they carry out the intent, real
or attributed, of the parties.'5 Because no single principle of interpreta-
tion can establish exactly what the parties intended, the determination
of intention requires the exercise of judgment.
The parties' intent is generally found in the words which they used
to express their intent in the collective bargaining agreement. 7 Although
contract language provides a significant indication of what the parties
intended, extrinsic evidence found in the bargaining history and the
parties' administration of the contract may also be helpful. 8 The imperfec-
tion of language makes it impossible to know what the intention is
without inquiring further and seeing what the circumstances were with
reference to which the words were used, and what the apparent object
the parties had in view. The intent manifested by the parties to each
other during negotiations by their communications and by their respon-
sive proposals-rather than undisclosed understandings and
impressions-should be considered in determining the meaning of con-
tract language.' 9
12.
13. Elkouri, supra note 4, at 348.
14. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Paper Group, 85-1 ARB 1 8013 (Bognanno 1984); Circle
Steel Corp., 85 LA 7 38, 40 (Stix 1984).
15. Southern Indiana Gas & Elec. Co., 86 LA 342, 343 (Schedler 1985); Indep. School
Dist. No. 47, 86 LA 97, 103 (Gallagher 1985). See also Zack & Bloch, supra note 4, at
6; Labor Standards Ass'n, 83 LA 9, 11 (Talarico 1984); Elkouri, supra note 4, at 348 ("In
determining the intent of the parties, inquiry is made as to what the language meant
to the parties when the agreement was written.").
16. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction S 45.05 at 22 (4th ed. 1984).
[hereinafter cited as Sutherland].
17. Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., 16 LA 229, 233 (Justin 1951). Accord Duluth
Community Action Inc., 82 LA 426, 430 (Boyer 1984).
18. Linn, Situation Ethics and the Arbitrator's Role-Comment, Proceedings of the
Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 176, 179 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Linn]; Robertshaw Controls Co., 85 LA 538, 541 (Williams 1985).
19. \Kahn's & Co., 83 LA 1225, 1231 (Murphy 1984); City of Burlington, 83 LA 973,
975 (Traynur 1984).
19861
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Consideration of what purpose a collective bargaining agreement pro-
vision is supposed to accomplish is also frequently mentioned as the basis
for interpretation of a collective bargaining provision.' The purpose may
be ascertained from the language of the contract as well as evidence
of the bargaining history and the parties' administration of the contract."
In determining the purpose of contract language, Saul Wallen sug-
gested that an arbitrator should give consideration to his or her own
familiarity with the general nature of labor agreements, the usual prob-
lems of plant administration, the particular practices of the industry or
plant in question, and the sophistication and writing ability of the drafters
of the disputed agreements.'
C. Clear and Unambiguous Language
It is frequently stated that arbitrators are bound to give effect to
the literal meaning of the language without consulting other indicia of
intent or meaning when the language is "plain" or "clear and unam-
biguous."' 3 An arbitrator's failure to follow language which is found to
be clear and unambiguous may result in the award being vacated.
Language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of more than one
meaning.2" It has been held that language is not ambiguous if an ar-
bitrator can determine its meaning without any other guide, because
the words of the agreement are plain and clearly convey a distinct idea."
20. See, e.g., Dillingham Shipyard, 86 LA 811, 815 (Tsukiyama 1986); Louisiana-
Pacific Corp., 86 LA 301, 304 (Michelstetter 1986); Columbus Auto Parts Co., 85 LA 677,
680 (Abrams 1985); Tenneco West, 85-1 ARB 1 8158 (Williams 1984); Hussman Corp., 84
LA 137, 141 (Roberts 1983); General Battery Corp., 83-2 ARB 8548 (Seidman 1983). See
B. Landis, Value Judgments in Arbitration: A Case Study of Saul Wallen 60 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Landis].
21. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 86 LA at 304; General Tel. Co., 84 LA 1227, 1282 (Kubie
1985). See also R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 88 (1975).
22. Landis, supra note 20, at 60. See also Garrett, supra note 5, 143-44.
23. Oak Grove School Dist., 85 LA 653, 655 (Concepcion 1985); Indep. School Dist.
No. 47, 86 LA at 103; Empire Tractor & Equip. Co., 85 LA 345, 349 (Koven 1985); Boogaart
Supply Co., 84 LA 27, 29 (Fogelberg 1984); Town of Davie, 83 LA 1153, 1157 (Kanzer
1984); Nekoosa Corp., 83 LA 676, 679-80 (Flaten 1984); Klopfenstein's, 75 LA 1224, 1226
(Lumbley 1981). See also Nolan, supra note 1, at 162; Elkouri, supra note 4, at 342; Prasow
& Peters, supra note 4, at 90.
24. District 72, Machinists v. Teter Tool & Die, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 732, 736 (N.D.
Ind. 1986) (holding arbitrator had "entirely disregarded" clear language and was without
authority to disregard or modify plain and unambiguous provisions of contract). Compare
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)
(While an arbitrator may look for guidance from many sources, an arbitration award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.).
25. Sunrise Medical, 86 LA 798, 799 (Redel 1985); Hobart Corp., 86 LA 612, 618
(Chalfie 1986); Canton Drop Forging & Mfg. Co., 85 LA 570, 573 (Richard 1985); IMC
Magnetics Corp., 84 LA 1310, 1313 (Talmadge 1985); American Oil Co., 62-1 ARB 8037
(Boles 1961).
26. Midland Brick & Tile Co., 77 LA 49, 55 (Newmark 1981).
[Vol. 16:31
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An arbitrator may find language to be ambiguous despite both parties'
contentions that the language is clear and unambiguous.' Language con-
tains a latent ambiguity when the language is clear on its face, but some
extrinsic fact makes the language susceptible to more than one inter-
pretation.28
It is not always clear whether the words of a collective bargaining
agreement are clear and unambiguous. Whether contract language is am-
biguous can frequently be determined only after taking into considera-
tion the circumstances existing at the time the contract was adopted
and the practice of the parties in applying it.' Even where contract
language appears unambiguous on its face, it can be rendered ambiguous
by its interaction with and its relation to other contract provisions."
D. Strict or Liberal Interpretaion
"Liberal interpretation" is often used to describe an interpretation
which produces broader coverage or more inclusive application.' A liberal
construction makes a contract provision applicable to more things or in
more situations than would be the case under a so-called "strict con-
struction." A strict interpretation is one which limits the application of
the contract provision.
32
It is sometimes said that remedial provisions should be given liberal
interpretation and punitive provisions should be given strict interpreta-
tion.Y Occasionally a contract may expressly provide that it is to "be
strictly construed."' When an exception is stated as a general principle
the exception should be strictly, though properly, construed and applied.'
If a contract is properly interpreted, it probably serves no useful
27. Bell Tel. Laboratories, 39 LA 1191, 1204 (Roberts 1962) (each side claimed
language was unambiguous, but asserted different interpretation). Compare RRS, Inc.,
86 LA 664, 666 (Redel 1985) (parties' disagreement as to meaning of phrase did not mean
it was ambiguous); Andrew Williams Meat Co., 8 LA 518, 524 (Cheney 1947) (language
found to be unambiguous although parties claimed that language was ambiguous).
28. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges, 84 LA 307, 313 (Gallagher 1985).
See Prasow & Peters, supra note 4, at 100-01.
29. Circle Steel Corp., 85 LA at 739. See 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts S 542
(rev. ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited to as Corbin].
30. Sutherland, supra note 16, at S 46.04. But see Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co.,
84-1 ARB 8194 (Weiss 1984) (extrinsic evidence should be used only to resolve ambiguities
which naturally exist in the written language, not to import ambiguities into language
which is otherwise clear and unambiguous).
31. See, e.g., Cornelius Co., 86 LA 329, 333 (Gallagher 1986).
32. Ibid., Anaheim Union High School Dist., 84 LA 101, 103 (Chance 1984).
33. Sutherland, supra 16, at SS 58.01 & 58.03.
34. See, e.g., Hobart Corp., 86 LA at 618 ("this Agreement shall be strictly
construed").
35. Unitog Co., 85 LA 740, 742 (Heinsz 1985); Verniton Corp., 77 LA 349, 352 (Ship-
man 1981).
19861
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purpose to describe the interpretation as either "strict" or "liberal."36
E. Mandatory or Permissive Interpretation
Ordinarily the use of the word "shall" carries with it the presump-
tion that it is used in the mandatory sense and "may" is used in the
permissive sense.37
II. INTERNAL STANDARDS
A. Introduction
Initially one must look at the collective bargaining agreement itself
for evidence of what the parties intended." Since the words in the con-
tract are chosen by the parties to express the meaning of the contract,
the words are no doubt the most important single factor in ascertaining
the parties' intent.3 9 When experienced negotiators draft collective
bargaining agreements, the presumption must be that they understand
what they are doing."0
In United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,"
the United States Supreme Court held an arbitrator is "confined to in-
terpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement.""2
While the arbitrator may look for guidance from many sources, the Court
said the arbitration "award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement.' ' 3 Accordingly, the
contract language is the first and most important point of reference when
interpreting a contract."
B. Primary Standards
1. Plain Meaning
According to the "plain meaning rule," if a writing appears to be
36. Corbin, supra note 29, S 533 at 7.
37. See Federal Correctional Inst., 85 LA 553, 557 (Bowers 1985). See also Naval
Supply Center, 85 LA 655, 657 (Harkless 1985). Compare Allied Chem. Co., 83-2 ARB
8371 (Fitzsimmons 1983) ("will" is ordinarily permissive); Social Security Admin., 82 LA
249, 255 (Crew 1984) (distinguishing "will" and "may"); Social Security Admin., 76 LA
569, 571 (McDonald 1981) ("may" is ordinarily used in a permissive rather than mandatory
sense).
39. Oklahoma Steel Castings Co., 84 LA 1215, 1218 (Allen 1985). See BASF Wyan-
dotte Corp., 84 LA 1055, 1057 (Caraway 1985); Cloudsley Co., 84 LA 1264, 1268 (Donnelly
1985).
40. City of Brooklyn, 85 LA 799, 801 (Graham 1985). See supra text accompanying
note 32 and infra text accompanying note 90.
41. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
42. Id. at 597.
43. Ibid.
44. Rohr Industries, Inc., 85-1 ARB 1 8115 (Gentile 1984).
[Vol. 16:31
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plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from
the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence
of any nature.'5
The plain meaning rule has been criticized on the grounds that the
meaning of words varies with the "verbal context and surrounding cir-
cumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic education and ex-
perience of their users and their hearers or readers .... ," Prof. Wigmore
asserts it is a fallacy to assume "that there is or ever can be some one
real or absolute meaning."'" To the same effect, Justice Holmes stated
in Toume v. Eisner,' "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged,
it is the skin of a living thought in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used."'9
The plain meaning rule has been rejected by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts:
It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence cannot change the
plain meaning of a writing, but meaning can almost never be
plain except in context.... Any determination of meaning or am-
biguity should only be made in the light of the relevant evidence
of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter
of the transaction, preliminary negotiations and statements made
therein, usages of trade, and the course of dealing between the
parties.... But after the transaction has been shown in all its
length and breadth, the words of an integrated agreement re-
main the most important evidence of intention.'
All surrounding circumstances, prior to and contemporaneous with
the making of the agreement, which may help clarify the sense of the
words in question should be taken into account. In Maple Heights Bd.
of Educ.,5  the arbitrator wrote:
While it cannot be disputed that the clear language of the Hours
provision of the contract, if taken by itself without relation to
45. Mohawk Rubber Co., 83 LA 814, 816 (Flannagan 1984) ("The words must be
given their ordinary meaning, even though this might not have been the meaning in-
tended by the parties."). See Zack & Bloch, supra note 4, at 7. Elkouri & Elkouri, supra
note 4, at 348-50; Nolan, supra note 1, at 162-64. See also J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The
Law of Contracts S 3-9 at 117 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Calamari & Perillo]. See
supra text accompanying note 23 and infra text accompanying notes 123 and 172.
46. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 45, at 117, quoting from 3 A. Corbin, Contracts
5 579 at 225 n.74 (1964 supp.).
47. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence S 2462 (3d ed. 1940).
48. 245 U.S. 418 (1918).
49. Id. at 425.
50. Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 212 comment b (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Restatement].
51. 86 LA 338 (Van Pelt 1985).
19861
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any other facts, would indicate that it was the intention of the
negotiators of the 1978 contract that the secretaries would be
paid for the lunch period, it is necessary in this case to look
further behind the language to determine the true intent of the
parties.'
According to Prof. Corbin:
[S]ome of the surrounding circumstances always must be known
before the meaning of the words can be plain and clear; and proof
of the circumstances may make a meaning plain and clear when
in the absence of such proof some other meaning may also have
seemed plain and clear. Sometimes the circumstances proof of
which is offered do not have any probative value and do not af-
fect a meaning that is arrived at without them. When such is
the case, such circumstances are immaterial. In other cases, the
testimony of additional factors may not be believed by the trial
court after it has been admitted, in which case the meaning of
words that is otherwise "plain and clear" will be adopted.
Cases in which this is said should be carefully examined to
determine whether or not the circumstances proof of which is
offered would in fact have any probative value. Of course, an
otherwise "plain" meaning should not be disturbed by the proof
of irrelevant circumstances or those having only a remote bear-
ing or inconsequential weight. But until a court knows the cir-
cumstances it can not [sic] properly say that they have no pro-
bative value.'
In the opinion of Roger Traynor, former Chief Justice of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, the test of admissibility of evidence offered to ex-
plain the meaning of contract language is not whether it appears to be
plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence
is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument
is reasonably susceptible.'
At the least, a party who questions the application of the plain mean-
ing rule to a contract provision should show either that some other sec-
tion of the contract expands or restricts its meaning or the provision
itself is repugnant to the general purview of the agreement.55
52. Id. at 340.
53. Corbin, supra note 29, S 542 at 101-05.
54. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage Co., 69 Cal. 2d 551, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641, 644 (1968). See also Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 85-1 ARB
8215 (Sartain 1985) (long continued practice may "throw light on what was meant" by
plain language).
55. See Sutherland, supra note 16, S 46.01 at 74.
[Vol. 16:31
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2. Ordinary and Popular Meaning
a. Generally
It is frequently said that words should be given their ordinary and
popular meaning in the absence of anything indicating that they were
used in a different sense or that the parties intended some special mean-
ing.' The Restatement of Contracts provides:
In the absence of some contrary indication, therefore, English
words are read as having the meaning given them by general
usage, if there is one. This rule is a rule of interpretation in
the absence of contrary evidence, not a rule excluding contrary
evidence."
This reflects a concern for the meaning communicated to others by the
contract language.m
One arbitrator has suggested that, when each of the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement has a different understanding of what
was intended by certain language, the party whose understanding is in
accord with the ordinary meaning of that language should prevail in the
absence of misrepresentation, fraud, or mistake.59
Because the meaning which is attributed to words and to conduct
can differ from place to place, from trade to trade, and from employer
to employer, application of the standard of-ordinary and popular mean-
ing may not always give the desired result.'
b. Dictionary Definitions
Arbitrators have frequently relied upon the dictionary definitions
of words in determining the ordinary and popular meaning.61 However,
56. Nolan, supra note 1, at 168; 4 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts S 618 at 705
(4th ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Williston].
57. Restatement, supra note 50, at S 202 comment e. See, e.g., Parker White Metal
Co., 86 LA 512, 516 (Ipavec 1985); Anaheim Union High School Dist., 84 LA 101, 104
(Chance 1984); Arco Pipe Line Co., 84 LA 907, 909 (Nicholas 1985) (clear contractual language
must be interpreted "in a literal and plain fashion") Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist.,
68 LA at 1370.
58. See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944).
59. Hanon & Wilson Co., 67-2 ARB 1 8583 (Kates 1967). Accord Stuart Hall Co.,
86 LA 370, 372 (Madden 1985).
60. See Murray, supra note 3, S 112 at 244.
61. See Kroger Co., 85 LA 1198, 1201 (St. Antoine 1985) (using Black's Law Dic-
tionary to define "and/or"); Steel Valley School Dist., 84 LA 1178, 1180 (Stoltenberg 1985)
(defining "exigency"); Consolidation Coal Co., 84 LA 36, 40, 85-1 ARB 8088 (Rybolt 1984)
(defining "permanent"); Florida Power Corp., 83-2 ARB 8461 (Wahl 1983) (defining
"'normally"); Kansas City Area Transp. Authority, 82 LA 409, 413 (Maniscalco 1984) (us-
ing Black's Law Dictionary to define "theft" and "scienter"); Fran Jom, Inc., 75 LA 97,
99 (Siegel 1980) (defining "licensed physician"); Dept. of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 72 LA
19861
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one advocate has cautioned that the precise or dictionary meaning of
contract language often falls short of expressing fundamental postulates,
understandings, assumptions, or policies.
62
c. Judicial Definitions
The decisions of appellate courts may also provide assistance in deter-
mining the meaning of contract terms. 3
d. Technical Terms
Technical terms should be given their technical meaning, unless the
context or usage indicates a different meaning.' Some industrial rela-
tions terms have acquired special meaning. 5 Technical dictionaries may
be useful for ascertaining the meaning of terms used in their technical
sense."
3. Construing Contract as a Whole
A primary rule in construing a collective bargaining agreement is
to determine the intent of the parties from the instrument as a whole. 7
If one of the asserted interpretations is logically supported by other
788, 794 (Hayes 1979) (defining "performance"); Cincinnati Post & Times Star, 68 LA 129,
138 (Chalfie 1977) (defining "installation"); Int'l Harvester Co., 12 LA 650, 652 (McCoy
1947) (defining "assigned").
62. Segal, Arbitration: A Union Viewpoint, Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual
Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 47, 51 (1958). See also Sterling Casting Corp.,
83-2 ARB 8456 (Steinberg 1983) (words must be given meanings the parties mutually
intended, not necessarily the definitions that would be accorded in general usage); Southern
New England Tel. Co., 61 LA 184, 187 (Zack 1973) ("hired" should be viewed in its labor
relations context and not in its dictionary usage).
63. See City of Westland, 86 LA 305, 307-08 (Howlett 1985) (ascertaining the mean-
ing of "salary").
64. Nolan, supra note 1, at 168-69; Restatement, supra note 50, at S 202(3)(b) com-
ment f ("Parties to an agreement often use the vocabulary of a particular place, vocation
or trade, in which new words are coined and common words are assigned new mean-
ings."). See Zack & Bloch, supra note 4, at 8-9.
65. See General Disposal Corp., 85 LA 299, 301 (Lumbley 1985) (referring to "the
common idiom of labor relations"); Viking Int'l Airlines, 85 LA 422, 423 (Flagler 1985).
66. See, e.g., Columbian Carbon Co., 47 LA 1120, 1125 (Merrill 1967). See Dostal
& Lowey, 82 LA 906, 909 (Wyman 1984) (using Roberts' Dictionary of Industrial Rela-
tions to define "layoff"). See also Nolan, supra note 1, at 169.
67. Restatement, supra note 50, at S 202(2); Elkouri, supra note 4, at 352. See Amana
Refrigeration, Inc., 86 LA 827, 829 (Kulkis 1986) ("The rule primarily to be observed in
the construction of written agreements is that the interpretator [sic] must review and
consider the agreement and/or related articles, in whole or in conjunctive parts."); Cer-
tified Grocers of Calif., Ltd., 85 LA 414, 417 (Sabo 1985); Witco Chem. Corp., 85 LA 120,
122 (Holman 1985); Allied Chem. Co., 83-2 ARB 1 8371 (Fitzsimmons 1983); Tri-County
Metro. Transp. Dist., 68 LA at 1370; Riley Stoker Corp., 7 LA 764, 766 (Platt 1947).
[Vol. 16:31
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contract provisions and the other is not, then the former meaning should
be upheld."'
Dean Harry Shulman recognized the importance of construing a col-
lective bargaining agreement as a whole, declaring, "Though all the parts
of the agreement do not necessarily make a consistent pattern, the in-
terpretation which is most compatible with the agreement as a whole
is to be preferred over one which creates anomaly." 9
Language should be construed and harmonized with other provisions
so as to give it uniform meaning."° A word used by the parties in one
sense should be interpreted in the same manner throughout the con-
tract in the absence of countervailing reasons." The use of two different
terms probably indicates the parties intended two different meanings."
Where the parties have agreed in other provisions to exclude certain
items, their failure to exclude those items in the provision in question
may indicate the parties did not intend that those items be excluded
in that provision.73
4. Giving Effect to All Provisions
Because it can be assumed the paties did not intend one provision
of the contract to cancel out another provision, if the language is suscep-
tible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat
the object of the contract, the one which will carry out the contract
should prevail."4
All language should be given meaning and should not be ignored. 5
Effect should be given, if possible, to every word, sentence, and clause
in the contract." No words should be rejected as surplusage if any
reasonable meaning can be found.7 Because the parties' use of a word
68. Landis, supra note 20, at 58.
69. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 999,
1018 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Shulman], reprinted in Proceedings of the Ninth Annual
Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 169, 181 (1956).
70. City of Burlington, 83 LA 971, 975 (Traynor 1984).
71. Ford Motor Co., 48 LA 1213, 1215 (Platt 1967).
72. Dept. of Navy, 86 LA 92, 96 (Connors 1985) ("[Slince the parties used both
terms ['negotiation' and 'discussion'], they intended that each must have some different
meaning.") See also Hanz Trucking, 46 LA 1057, 1062 (Anderson 1962).
73. Consolidation Coal Co., 83 LA 927, 931 (Duff 1984).
74. See Sutherland, supra note 16, S 46.05 at 91; Restatement, supra note 50, at
S 202(2) comment d ("Where the whole can be read to give significance to each part,
that reading is preferred; if such a reading would be unreasonable, a choice must be
made."). See also Kroger Co., 85 LA at 1201; Chillicothe Tel. Co., 84 LA 1, 3, 85-1 ARB
8109 (Gibson 1984); IMC Magnetics Corp., 84 LA 1310, 1313 (Talmadge 1985).
75. Timken Co., 85 LA 377, 381 (Morgan 1985).
76. Sutherland, supra note 16, at S 46.06.
77. Armstrong Rubber Co., 17 LA 741, 744 (Gorder 1952).
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indicates they intended it to have some meaning, an interpretation which
gives meaning to every part of the contract is preferred to one that
gives no effect to one or more parts."8 However, when there is an
unavoidable conflict between general and specific provisions, the specific
provision will prevail. 9
5. Context
Words must be interpreted with a view to the context in which they
are employed.' The Restatement of Contracts states:
Meaning is inevitably dependent on context. A word changes
meaning when it becomes part of a sentence, the sentence when
it becomes part of a paragraph.... To fit the immediate verbal
context or the more remote total context particular words or
punctuation may be disregarded or supplied; clerical or gram-
matical errors may be corrected; singular may be treated as
plural or plural as singular.8
The language being construed must be considered along with all the
other words by which it is surrounded, the history of the parties, the
nature of the industry or business, and other relevant circumstances.82
In addition to the contractual context, the importance of keeping
in mind the labor relations context when interpreting collective bargain-
ing agreements was stressed by Dean Shulman:
The effects on efficiency, productivity and cost are important
factors to be considered. So also are the effects on the attitudes
and interests of the employees. The interpretation, no matter
how right in the abstract, is self defeating and harmful to both
sides if its day-to-day application provides further occasion for
controversy and irritation.'
78. Restatement, supra note 50, at S 203(a); Murray, supra note 3, at S 115; Landis,
supra note 20, at 58. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co., 45 LA 540, 543 (Stouffer 1965).
79. See F & F Mold & Die Works, 17 LA 488, 490 (Uible 1951). See also Restate-
ment, supra note 50, at S 203(c).
80. Landis, supra note 20, at 59.
81. Restatement, supra note 50, at S 202 comment d. See, e.g., Dallas Symphony
Ass'n, 85 LA 1089, 1094 (Goodstein 1985); Bridgeport Shop 'n Save, 85-1 ARB 8021 (Das
1984); United States Steel Corp., 84 LA 49, 52 (Garrett 1985); Aloha Airlines, Inc., 84
LA 891, 893 (Brown 1985); Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, 83 LA 781, 785 (Williams
1984); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 20 LA 880, 888 (Gorder 1953).
82. Corbin, supra note 4, S 549 at 185-86; Murray, supra note 3, S 114 at 245; Landis,
supra note 20, at 59.
83. Shulman, supra note 69, at 1018. See, e.g., General Elec. Co., 85 LA 36, 40
(Gibson 1985).
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C. Secondary Standards
1. Obvious Mistakes
Obvious mistakes of grammar or punctuation may be corrected when
interpreting a contract." All that is necessary is that the agreement
as a whole and the surrounding circumstances convincingly establish that
a wrong word was inadvertently written or the punctuation is inap-
propriate."
2. Reasonable, Lawful, or Effective Interpretation
Where a provision is susceptible of two interpretations, one
reasonable or lawful and the other unreasonable or unlawful, the
reasonable or lawful interpretation is preferred.' This principle is based
on the assumption that the parties did not intend to negotiate a provi-
sion that is unreasonable, unlawful, or ineffective." However, if a term
is unconscionable or otherwise against public policy, it should be dealt
with directly rather than by spurious interpretation."
3. Harsh, Absurd, or Nonsensical Results
If the words of the agreement can be reasonably interpreted so as
to avoid a harsh, absurd, or nonsensical result, that interpretation is
preferable." Since the parties are charged with full knowledge of the
84. Murray, supra note 3, at S 122; Restatement, supra note 50, at S 202 comment
d ("To fit the immediate verbal context or the more remote total context ... clerical
or grammatical errors may be corrected."). See, e.g., Diversified Maint. Co., 84 LA 894,
897 (Draznin 1985) (inadvertent omission of "not"); Paper Converting Machine Co., 55 LA
1074, 1077 (Somers 1970) (inadvertent omission of "not").
85. Corbin, supra note 29, S 552 at 209. Compare PPG Industries, Inc., 70 LA 1148,
1151-52 (Taylor 1978) ("[It does appear somewhat suspect that such a blatant error could
have happened even once, much less repeatedly, as is apparently the case here.").
86. Murray, supra note 3, at S 116; Restatement, supra note 50, S 203(a) ("an inter-
pretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is prefer-
red to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or no effect"). See,
e.g., Owens-Illinois Co., 85 LA 967, 970 (Feldman 1985); W.E. Plechaty Co., 84 LA 571,
577 (Duda 1985); Chardon Rubber Co., 84-1 ARB 1 8117 (Leach 1984). See infra text ac-
companying note 182.
87. Nolan, supra note 1. at 146; Corbin, supra note 29, S 546 at 171; Restatement.
supra note 50, at S 203(a) comment d ("In the absence of contrary indication, it is assumed
that each term of an agreement has a reasonable rather than an unreasonable meaning.
and that the agreement is intended to be lawful rather than unconscionable, fraudulent
or otherwise illegal.")
88. Restatement, supra note 50, at S 203(a) comment d.
89. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 68 LA at 1370; Elkouri, supra note 4, at 354.
See, e.g., Witco Chem. Corp., 85 LA at 122; Hussman Corp., 84 LA at 141; Cloudsley Co.,
84 LA 1264, 1269 (Donnelly 1985); Fort Pitt Steel Casting Div., Conval-Penn, Inc., 76 LA
909, 911 (Sembower 1981); Amax Lead Co., 74 LA 998. 1004 (Roberts 1980); Bower Roller
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provisions of the contract and the significance of its language, the clear
meaning of the language is generally enforced even though the results
may be harsh or contrary to the general expectations of one of the
parties." It is not for the arbitrator to question whether the parties
made a good bargain.9
4. Specific Provisions Control General Provisions
Unless a contrary intention appears from the contract construed as
a whole, the meaning of a general provision of the contract should be
restricted by the more specific provisions of the contract.' It is thought
that the specific provision is more likely to be accurately expressed. 3
The Restatement of Contracts explains:
People commonly use general language without a clear con-
sciousness of its full scope and without awareness that an ex-
ception should be made. Attention and understanding are likely
to be in better focus when language is specific or exact, and in
case of conflict the specific or exact term is more likely to ex-
press the meaning of the parties with respect to the situation
than the general language. 4
If the specific term can be read as an exception or qualification of
the general term, both terms are given some effect. 5
5. Ejusdem Generis
Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where general words are
enumerated along with specific words, the general words are construed
to include only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated
by the specific words." The doctrine is an attempt to reconcile an in-
Bearing Co., 18 LA 409, 412 (1952); Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 12 LA 840, 846 (Platt 1949); Deep
Rock Oil Corp., 11 LA 25, 29, 31 (Merrill 1948).
90. Certified Grocers of Calif., Ltd, 85 LA at 417; Safeway Stores, Inc., 85 LA
472, 475 (Tharp 1985); Nolan, supra note 1, at 171. See Northwest Packing Co., 80 LA
591, 596 (Hedges 1983). But see Elkouri, supra note 4, at 360 (asserting that some ar-
bitrators have refused to apply "strict construction" where it was found the negotiators
were untrained in the precise use of words).
91. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 84-1 ARB 8194 (Weiss 1984).
92. Chillicothe Tel. Co., 84 LA at 3, 85-1 ARB 8109; Allied Chem. Co., 83-2 ARB
J 8371 (Fitzsimmons 1983); F & F Mold & Die Works, 17 LA at 490; Elkouri, supra note
4, at 356; Nolan, supra note 1, at 167; Murray, supra note 3, at S 122; Restatement, supra
note 50, at S 203(c) ("specific terms are given greater weight than general language").
See, e.g., Midwest Printing Co., 85 LA 615, 619 (Ver Ploeg 1985).
93. Corbin, supra note 29, S 547 at 178.
94. Restatement, supra note 50, at S 203 comment e.
95. Ibid.
96. Florsheim Shoe Co., 85-1 ARB 1 8061 (Roberts 1984); Tri-County Metro. Transp.
Dist., 68 LA at 1370; Sutherland, supra note 16, at S 47.17.
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compatibility between specific and general words so that all words in
a document can be given effect and no words will be superfluous.97
The doctrine applies when the following conditions exist:
1. The clause contains an enumeration by specific words;
2. The members of the enumeration suggest a class;
3. The clause is not exhausted by the enumeration;
4. A general reference supplementing the enumeration, usual-
ly following it; and
5. An intent that the general term be given a broader mean-
ing than the doctrine requires is not clearly manifested.9 8
In Giant Stores, Inc." the contract provided that "seniority shall
prevail in layoffs, reduction in hours, rehiring, promotions, transfer from
one work shift to another, ect."'0° Applying the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, the arbitrator concluded that the general term "etc." was limited
by the preceding specific terms. 1 1
In United Technologies Essex Group, Inc.'" the contract defined "tem-
porary layoff' as "a layoff due to curtailment or failure of electrical,
gas, water or any power or general disaster, or when it is due to
breakdown of machinery or other reasons beyond the control of the Com-
pany." Construing the phrase "other reasons beyond the control of the
Company", the arbitrator held the doctrine of ejusdem generis limited
the meaning of the phrase to the class described by the preceding specific
terms. 3 According to the arbitrator, "other reasons beyond the control
of the Company" as used in the provision did not include economic
downturn or strikes. 4
6. Avoidance of Forfeiture
If a provision can reasonably be given either of two possible inter-
pretations, one of which will result in a penalty or forfeiture, the inter-
pretation that will not result in a forfeiture or penalty should be
favored."5 Prof. Nolan suggests that forfeitures are not to be found unless
the intent is clear or no other interpretation is reasonably possible.'"
97. Sutherland, supra note 16, at S 47.17.
98. Id. at 47.18.
99. 74 LA 909 (Larney 1980).
100. Id. at 910.
101. Id. at 915.
102. 77 LA 561 (House 1981).
103. Id. at 568.
104. Ibid.
105. Elkouri, supra note 4, at 356-57; Nolan, supra note 1, at 169-70; Corbin, supra
note 29, S 552 at 212. See, e.g., Western Airlines, Inc., 85 LA 311, 313 (Brisco 1985); CPC
Int'l, Inc., 77 LA 986, 993 (Edes 1981).
106. Nolan, supra note 1, at 170.
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However, an arbitrator is not free to decide whether he or she likes
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement."°7 Arbitrators cannot
stretch clear language of default in order to avoid forfeitures. '°8
7. Grievance Settlements and Prior Arbitration Awards
When prior arbitration awards between different employers or unions
involve contractual provisions similar to those in question, the prior
awards may provide guidance for interpreting the contract in question.' °
Arbitrators are reluctant to arrive at a different conclusion when there
is any ground at all for reaching the same conclusion reached in a prior
arbitration between the parties, when passing on the same question
under identical contract language."0
The settlement of a grievance by the mutual agreement of the parties
deserves considerable weight as providing a settled construction of con-
tract language."'
8. Changes in Contract Language
When parties change contract language, it would appear that they
also intended to change the meaning of the contract. "'
When the prior contract contains an express exception and the newly
negotiated language does not include the express exception, it would
appear the parties have clearly intended to abolish the exception."3
9. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (to express one thing
107. See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. at 597.
108. Wayne County Interm. School Dist., 85 LA 673, 675-76 (Daniel 1985).
109. See, e.g., R.A. Cullinan & Son, Inc., 85 LA 162, 165 (Newmark 1985) (meaning
of "employee"); Morton Thiokol, Inc., 85 LA 500, 503 (Murphy 1985); Woodings-Verona
Tool Works, Inc., 84 LA 68, 73 (McDermott 1984) (meaning of "employment termination").
See also Kramer, supra note 2, at 166.
110. See Gorton-Pew Fisheries Co., 16 LA 365, 368 (Wallen 1951).
111. McDonnell Douglas Corp.. 78 LA 401, 403-04 (Winton 1982). See also Block, Prob-
lems of Proof in the Arbitration Process: Report of West Coast Tripartite Committee, Pro-
ceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators
119, 143 (1981) [hereinafter cited as West Coast Tripartite Committee]; Elkouri & Elkouri,
supra note 4, at 206-07. But see General Elec. Co., 85 LA at 40 (settlement did not necessar-
ily establish a precedent because both parties did not specifically agree that the settlements
would do so).
112. See, e.g., Thrifty Corp., 85 LA 780, 783 (Gentile 1985); Florsheim Shoe Co., 85-1
ARB 1 8061 (Roberts 1984); Wagner-Wood Co., 84 LA 753, 758 (Dworkin 1985) (employer's
rights increased when, in the 1984 negotiations, union agreed to remove school vacation
proviso so that students could be employed year round).
113. Int'l Harvester Corp., 12 LA at 652.
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is to exclude another) is frequently applied by arbitrators."' The maxim
provides that where certain matters are specified in detail in a contract,
other matters of the same general character relating to the same matter
are generally held to be excluded.' 5 This maxim is based on the
reasonable assumption that if the matter does not appear in the list,
the parties did not intend it to be there.'6 However, the rule must be
applied with caution, and if its application would result in injustice or
inconsistency, it should be ignored."'
In County of Orange,"8 the contract banned "discrimination by reason
of physical handicap, marital status, or medical condition ... or race,
religion, color, sex, age, national origin or ancestry." The arbitrator con-
cluded that, by expressly prohibiting specific types of discrimination
which did not include sexual preference or homosexuality, the parties
had excluded claims of discrimination because of homosexuality from the
contract."'
The maxim is inapplicable where the listed exceptions were obviously
not meant to be the only exceptions.'"' For example, the use of the term
"include" in a list may indicate the parties did not intend the list to
be limited.' 2'
III. STANDARDS GOING BEYOND THE CONTRACT
A. Introduction
Consideration of matters outside the written contract may provide
assistance in interpreting contract language. While the express provi-
sions of the contract are an important source for determining the mean-
ing of contract provisions, it is frequently necessary to go beyond the
contract provisions in order to interpret the contract.' 2
114. Elkouri, supra note 4, at 355.
115. Murray, supra note 3, at S 120; Elkouri, supra note 4, at 355. See Kroger Co.,
86 LA 357, 368 (Milentz 1986); Hussman Corp., 84 LA at 141 (to expressly state certain
exceptions indicates there are no other exceptions); Iowa Meat Processing Co., 84 LA
933, 935 (Madden 1985); Bolens Corp., 83 LA 1286, 1289 (Wyman 1984).
116. Zack & Bloch, supra note 4, at 8; Sutherland, supra note 16, at S 47.24 ("It
expresses the learning of common experience that when people say one thing they do
not mean something else.").
117. Murray, supra note 3, at S 47.25.
118. 76 LA 1040 (Tamoush, 1981).
119. Id. at 1043.
120. Sutherland, supra note 16, at S 48.23.
121. Id. at S 47.23.
122. Linn, supra note 18, at 179. See, e.g., Robertshaw Controls Co., 85 LA at 541.
See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597
(An arbitrator may look for guidance from many sources provided the award draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement.).
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B. Parol Evidence Rule
1. Generally
The parol evidence rule provides that, in the absence of fraud, duress,
or mutual mistake, a final written expression of the complete agreement
may not be contradicted by evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral
or written understandings and negotiations."z It is not a rule of evidence,
but one of substantive law which defines the limits of a contract."m Where
parol evidence is. excluded, it is because the evidence is irrelevant. 2 '
The parol evidence rule applies when the parties to a written con-
tract intend the written agreement to be the final and complete integra-
tion of all the terms of that contract." Where the parties to an oral
agreement choose their words with explicit precision and completeness,
it may be treated as an integrated agreement and the parol evidence
rule applied to it.' The question of whether an agreement is an in-
tegrated agreement is a question of fact to be determined in accordance
with all relevant evidence."2
The parol evidence rule does not preclude parol evidence from be-
ing used to prove the making of a contemporaneous contract which does
not cover the same ground as the integrated writing, or one which might
reasonably be expected to be embodied in a separate contract."2 The
rule applies only to evidence, which if given weight, would alter, vary,
or contradict the terms of the written contract.'" The rule has no ap-
plication to agreements made after the integrated contract. 3'
123. Corbin, supra note 29, S 573 at 357-58; Williston, supra note 56. S 631 at 948-49;
Murray, supra note 3. S 105 at 227-28; Calamari & Perillo, supra note 45, at S 3-2;
Fairweather, supra note 4, at 199. See supra text accompanying notes 23 and 45.
124. Williston, supra note 56, S 631 at 955. See also M. Hill & A. Sinicropi, Evidence
in Arbitration 51 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hill & Sinicropi; Garrett, supra note 5, at 126.
125. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 45, at S 3-5. See also Restatement, supra note
50, at S 215.
126. Hill & Sinicropi, supra note 124, at 51; Calamari & Perillo, supra note 45, at
S 3-2; City of Gainesville, 82 LA 825, 828 (Hall 1984). See Restatement, supra note. 50,
at S 209.
127. See Restatement, supra note 50, at S 209 comment b.
128. Restatement, supra note 50, at S 209 comment c.
129. Williston, supra note 56, S 631 at 949-50; Restatement, supra note 50, at 5
213 comment c. See, e.g., Pettibone Corp., 70 LA 383, 385-86 (Gootnick 1978).
130. Hill & Sinicropi, supra note 124, at 52; Zack & Bloch, supra note 4, at 9; Restate-
ment, supra note 4, at S 215. See, e.g., Modesto City Schools, 85 LA 795, 797 (Concepcion
1985) (parol evidence will not be allowed where the contract is clear and unambiguous);
Boogaart Supply Co., 84 LA at 29, 85-1 ARB 1 8068 (oral statements are not normally
admissible to modify, vary, explain or contradict the plain terms of a valid written
agreement).
131. Williston, supra 56, S 631 at 950-51; Calamari & Perillo, supra 45, at S 3-6.
Cf General Tire & Rubber Co., 71 LA 813, 815-16 (Richman 1978); ASG Industries, Inc.,
70 LA 1225, 1228 (Cantor 1978).
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The parol evidence rule is based on the theory that, where the
parties have expressed their agreement in writing, it is conclusively pre-
sumed the written agreement represents the complete agreement, and
evidence of prior or contemporaneous conversations or declarations tend-
ing to substitute a new and different contract for the one evidenced
by the writing is incompetent.3 '
2. Complete Agreement
There is persuasive authority for the view that the parol evidence
rule does not preclude consideration of extrinsic evidence relating to
the preliminary question of whether the parties intended the written
contract to be the complete agreement."3 According to Prof. Corbin, a
writing cannot prove its own completeness." Even if the agreement con-
tains an express statement as to its own completeness, Corbin states
that the assent of the parties must still be proved. 3 5 Prof. Corbin con-
cludes that parol testimony is certainly admissible to show the cir-
cumstances under which the agreement was made and the purposes for
which it was executed.'
On the other hand, if the contract expressly declares that it con-
tains the entire agreement of the parties, Prof. Williston believes the
introduction of evidence of prior understandings to vary or contradict
the written contract is improper unless the document is obviously in-
complete."3 Williston's view has been adopted by a number of arbitrators,
some of whom have relied upon zipper and completeness of agreement
clauses."
Arbitrators have also relied upon provisions limiting the arbitrator
from "amending, modifying, nullifying, ignoring, or adding to the provi-
132. Murray, s-upra note 3, S 105 at 228-29. See United Drill & Tool Corp., 28 LA
677, 679-80 (Cox 1957) ("[Tlhe rule is bottomed on common sense."); Pillsbury Mills, 14
LA 1045, 1048-49 (Kelliher 1950) ("This is not simply a technical rule, but has a long range
importance in the maintenance of good relations between the parties.") See also Fleming
Companies, Inc., 85-1 ARB 8005 (Madden 1984); Kennecott Copper Corp., 70-2 ARB
8849 (Abernethy 1970); Container Corp., 51 LA 1146, 1149 (Morris 1969).
133. Restatement, supra note 50, at S 209 comment b ("That a writing was or was
not adopted as a completely integrated agreement may be proved by any relevant
evidence.") and S 214; Calamari & Perillo, supra note 45, S 3-3 at 103; Corbin, supra note
29, at S 582.
134. Corbin, supra note 29, S 582 at 448. Accord Restatement, supra note 50, at
S 214 comment a.
135. Corbin, supra note 50, S 582 at 449.
136. Id., S 582 at 451.
137. Williston, supra note 56, at S 633.
138. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Cook County, 73 LA 310, 316 (Hill 1979); Oconomowoc
Canning Co., 77-1 ARB 8194 (Mueller 1977). See also Mueller, The Law of Contracts-A
Changing Legal Environment, Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting, National
Academy of Arbitrators 204, 210-15 (1978).
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sions of the agreement" as requiring strict application of the parol
evidence rule.'39
C. Clear and Unambiguous Language
Most authorities agree that parol evidence should not be allowed
to vary terms that are clear and unambiguous."0 However, considera-
tion of parol evidence may be necessary in order to determine whether
the terms are "clear and unambiguous."'
It is clearly appropriate to use parol evidence to construe ambiguous
language."' The evidence is used, not to contradict the terms of the con-
tract, but to explain or clarify.
C. Bargaining History
1. Generally
Bargaining history and pre-contract negotiations between the parties
are valuable and proper sources from which to ascertain the meaning
of contract language."3 The intent manifested by the parties to each other
during negotiations by their communications and their responsive
139. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Cook County, 73 LA at 316. For a management ad-
vocate's view of the parol evidence rule, see Fairweather, supra note 4, at 199:
In labor arbitration the parol evidence rule is a construction doctrine which
is closely related to the view that the scope of an arbitrator's jurisdiction is
limited to disputes which involve the interpretation and application of a provi-
sion of the written agreement between the parties. In addition, the parol evidence
rule is closely related to the reserved rights construction doctrine which holds
that management is restricted by the commitments it has made and recorded
within the four corners of the written labor agreement, and that unless so
restricted the basic managerial authority remains unrestricted.
But see Garrett, supra note 5, at 127-28 (Because collective bargaining agreement cannot
contain all essential rules or guidelines for day-to-day administration of industrial rela-
tions, this casts doubt on the suggestion that the typical "will not add to" boiler plate
language describing the arbitrator's authority fairly represents a conscious adoption of
the parol evidence rule.).
140. Nolan, supra note 1, at 140. See, e.g., Northern Calif. Woodworking Mfrs. Ass'n,
79 LA 946, 947-48 (Koven 1982).
141. See Restatement, supra note 50, at S 214 comment b ("Even though words seem
on their face to have only a single possible meaning, other meanings often appear when
the circumstances are disclosed."); Nolan, supra note 1, at 140-41; Zack & Bloch, supra,
at 4; Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 Yale L.J. 525, 549-50
(1969). See also supra text accompanying note 29.
142. See Fairweather, supra note 4, at 203; Elkouri, supra note 4, at 413; Hill &
Sinicropi, supra note 124, at 53.
143. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 86 LA 437, 440 (Darrow 1985); Mid-South Transp.
Mgmt., 85 LA 1204, 1210-11 (Holley 1985); Monsanto Indus. Chems., 85 LA 113, 117
(Grinstead 1985); Central Bag Co., 82 LA 13, 125 (Madden 1983); Southwest Ornamental
Iron Co., 38 LA 1025, 1028-29 (Murphy 1962). See also Landis, supra note 20, at 62.
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proposals -rather than undisclosed understandings and impressions-
may be considered in determining the meaning of contract language."
2. Rejection of Proposal
There is remarkable unanimity among arbitrators that an attempt
to obtain a specific enlargement of rights in negotiations which is re-
jected is not only an indication that the right does not exist by agree-
ment, but not by past practice as well. " 5 Because a party cannot obtain
through arbitration that which it could not obtain through negotiation,
an arbitrator should not construe the contract as though the rejected
provision had been agreed to.'" However, one advocate has warned that
the use of offers and counter-offers made during the process of negotia-
tions is sometimes an unsafe guide to the meaning of the contract."'
One should be careful of construing the rejection of an offer as ter-
minating an established past practice. In FMC-Ordinance Division,'5 the
arbitrator stated:
The body of arbitral thought supports the conclusion that a new
item sought in negotiations and not achieved should be viewed
as an admission that the asking. party does not then have the
right or thing it is seeking, and that if it is unsuccessful in ob-
taining that which was sought the asking party has probably
foresworn possession of that right or thing sought, and an ar-
bitrator should reject any subsequent attempt of the party to
achieve it via an arbitration award. Where it has been an
established and uncontested -though unwritten- practice of the
asking party, rejection of the proposed codification of that prac-
tice in the agreement should not be construed by an arbitrator
as indicative of the party's relinquishing of the right without ad-
ditional evidence that such was the parties' intent. Rather, what
the party has done-absent evidence of the contrary-is relin-
quish the right to pursue its attempt to put the matter into the
agreement, while relying upon a clear history of practices to sup-
port its position should it be challenged at some future date."'
144. Kahn's & Co., 83 LA 1225, 1231 (Murphy 1984); City of Burlington, 83 LA 971,
975 (Traynor 1984).
145. Buchmin Industries, 84 LA 1069, 1072 (Rothschild 1985).
146. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 85 LA 305, 308 (Madden 1985, Central Grocers
of Calif., Ltd., 85 LA at 417; Disneyland, 85-1 ARB 8213 (Gentile 1984); Hussman Corp.,
84 LA at 141; Bolens Corp., 83 LA 1286, 1289 (Wyman 1984); Central Bag Co., 82 LA at 125.
147. Ahner, supra note 4, at 84-85.
148. 84 LA 163 (Wyman 1985).
149. Id. at 167.
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3. Clarification
Rejection of a proposal should not be construed as extinguishing a
right, if it can be shown the claimed right existed prior to negotiations
and the proposal was merely an attempt to clarify the situation." Ar-
bitrator Saul Wallen has reasoned:
Sometimes ... language is proposed in order to remove any
doubts about the clarity of the clause but if the language is ob-
jected to and is withdrawn to facilitate agreement, it does not
automatically follow that the party withdrawing the proposal em-
braces the opposite interpretation. He may in fact withdraw the
language, in order to clear an obstacle to agreement, either on
a specific assurance that the language accepted means just what
the proper of the additional words intends or, more frequently,
in the expectation that the words finally agreed on will be inter-
preted in the light of their inherent meaning after due considera-
tion is given to all factors and not alone-to the fact of abandon-
ment of the clarifying language. In the latter case the parties
in effect agree to take a chance on what the clause, minus the
clarifying words, means.'
D. Construction Against Party Creating Ambiguity
It is frequently stated that, when language is ambiguous, it should
be construed against the party that proposed the language.152 However,
the realities of collective bargaining may not be adequately disposed of
by interpreting language most severely against its author.'5 Because
labor contracts are usually much more of a joint product than commer-
cial contracts, this principle of interpretation should be given a narrow
application in labor arbitration."
E. Past Practice
1. Generally
Past practice is one of the most useful and frequently resorted to
aids for interpreting collective bargaining agreements.' While the ex-
150. Landis, supra note 20, at 63.
151. Id. at 63-64.
152. See, e.g., Bunny Bread Co., 85 LA 1118, 1121 (Krislov 1985); Lull Engineering
Co., 85 LA 581, 583 (Gallagher 1985).
153. Ahner, supra note 4. at 84.
154. Ibid.
155. See Dobbelaere, Leahy & Reardon, The Effect of Past Practice on the Arbitra-
tion of Labor Disputes, 40 Arb. J. Dec. 1985 at 27, 33 (hereinafter cited as Dobbelaere].
See, e.g., Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 84 LA 190, 191-92, 85-1 ARB J 8147 (Brisco 1985).
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press provisions of the contract are an important source for determin-
ing the parties' intent, often the arbitrator must go beyond the contract
provisions and consider the conduct of the parties as an additional in-
dicia of intent.' Reliance on past practice also provides stability and
predictability by assuring the parties that the interpretation "will fall
within an established tradition rather than the frolic of a single man."'' 7
Past practice may be defined as a prior course of conduct which is
consistently made in response to a recurring situation and is regarded
by the parties as the correct and required response under the cir-
cumstances.' In order for a past practice to have persuasive effect, the
practice should be one that has been consistently applied, was well-known
to the parties, and has existed over a relatively long period of time.'59
The weight given a past practice must be adjusted depending upon the
degree of underlying acceptability of the practice.'"
2. Interpretation of Ambiguous Terms
The most common use of past practice is the interpretation of am-
biguous language. Where language is ambiguous, established practice
may be evidence of the mutually accepted interpretation of the
language. 1 ' Past practice is persuasive evidence of what the language
meant to those who wrote it.'
3. Implementing General Language
Past practice may also be used to give more specificity to general
See also Murray, supra note 3, at 5 118; Williston, supra note 56, S 623 at 789-90 (great
weight is given as to how parties have interpreted contract); Corbin, supra note 29, at S 556.
156. Restatement, supra note 50, at S 220 comment d ("Usage relevant to inter-
pretation is treated as part of the context of an agreement in determining whether there
is ambiguity or contradiction as well as in resolving ambiguity or contradiction.").
157. Gilman, Past Practice in the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements
in Arbitration, 4 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 680, 689 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Gilman].
158. See Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Agreements, Proceedings
of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 30, 31-36 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Mittenthall. Treece, Past Practice and Its Relationship to Specific
Contract Language in the Arbitration of Grievance Disputes. 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 358, 359
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Treece]. See also Restatement, supra note 50, at S 220 com-
ment b.
159. Fashion Shoe Products, Inc., 84 LA 330 (Hilgert 1985). See Elkouri, supra note
4, at 440-41; Nolan, supra note 1, at 143-44; Restatement, supra note 50, at S 220 comment
b ("[A] party who asserts a meaning based on usage must show either that the other
party knew of the usage or that the other party had reason to know of it.").
160. Gilman, supra note 157, at 706; Treece, supra note 158, at 371.
161. See Dobbelaere, supra note 155, at 33. See, e.g., Sunrise Medical, 86 LA 798,
799 (Redel 1985); Whitman & Barnes, 46 LA 637, 638 (Smith 1965).
162. Mittenthal, supra note 158, at 37.
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language." 3 As the parties respond to the many different situations con-
fronting them, they find mutually acceptable ways of dealing with the
situation which serve to guide them in future situations.'" Thus, prac-
tices arise which represent the reasonable expectations of the parties
and provide a sound basis for interpreting and applying the general con-
tract language. "5
4. Adding Terms to Contract
Past practice, if sufficient in nature, may become a part of the con-
tract where the conract is silent.'66 In Metal Specialty Co.,'67 Arbitrator
Volz stated:
[Ilt is well recognized that the contractual relationship between
the parties normally consists of more than the written word. Day-
to-day practices mutually accepted by the parties may attain the
status of contractual rights and duties, particularly where they
are not at variance with any written provision negotiated into
the contract by the parties and where they are of long standing
and were not changed during contract negotiations.'
Professor Corbin wrote that usage and custom may be used, "not only
to aid in interpretation of the parties, but also to affect the contractual
relations of the parties by adding a provision to the contract that the
words of the parties can scarcely be said to have expressed.' 6. He ex-
plained that the use of past practice is generally to ascertain and to
give effect to the intention of the parties; it is not for the purpose of
compelling the parties to contract in accordance with usage.'7
5. Modification of Clear and Unambiguous Language
Arbitrators disagree as to whether a past practice may modify clear
163. See Dobbelaere, supra note 155, at 35; Mittenthal, supra note 158, at 38. See
also Elkouri, supra note 4, at 456.
164. Mittenthal, supra note 158, at 38.
165. Id. at 38-39; Dobbelaere, supra note 155, at 35.
166. Mittenthal, supra note 158, at 44-55; Restatement, supra note 50, at S 221 com-
ment a ("[Ilf there is a reasonable usage which supplies an omitted term and the parties
know or have reason to know of the usage, it is a surer guide than the court's own judg-
ment of what is reasonable."). See, e.g., Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 84 LA at 192, 85-1
ARB 1 8147; Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 85-1 ARB 8136 (Schwartz 1985); Dillon Stores
Co., 84 LA 84, 87 (Woolf 1984); Scott Paper Co., 82 LA 755, 757 (Caraway 1984); Gas
Service Co., 81 LA 245, 248-49 (Penfield undated); Edward C. Levy Co., 81 LA 529, 534-36
(Borland 1983).
167. 39 LA 1265 (Volz 1962).
168. Id. at 1269.
169. Corbin, supra note 29, S 556 at 240.
170. Id. S 556 at 241-42.
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and unambiguous contract language.'' The traditional approach main-
tains that evidence of past practice cannot overrule clear and unam-
biguous language. M This reasoning is based on the principle that, where
the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for the arbitrator
to resort to interpretative aids such as past practice in order to ascer-
tain the parties' intent.
7
1
Other arbitrators have permitted evidence of past practice to modify
clear and unambiguous language.17 ' According to these arbitrators, where
the past practice is persuasive evidence of the parties' mutual intent,
it should be controlling even where the contract is clear and unam-
biguous. 175 These arbitrators recognize that the expressed language is
not always the best evidence of the parties' intent and that the parties'
day-to-day actions, when they run counter to the plain meaning of the
contract's words, evidence an intent to substitute that which they ac-
tually do for that which they said in writing they would do.17
171. Dobbelaere, supra note 155, at 36. See supra text accompanying notes 23 and 45.
172. Landis, supra note 20, at 65 ("I draw the line at using past practice to modify
or amend what is unambiguous in an agreement.") See, e.g., Woodhaven School Dist., 86
LA 215, 217 (Daniel 1986) (past practices are seldom recognized when there is clear and
unambiguous language in the contract); BASF Wyandotte Corp., 84 LA at 1057. See also
Detroit Coil Co. v. Machinists Lodge 82, 594 F.2d 575, 580-81 (6th Cir. 1979) (Absent evidence
that parties had waived notice provision, arbitrator's finding of waiver manifested clear
failure to draw essence of award from agreement.). See supra text accompanying notes
23 and 45. Compare infra text accompanying note 174.
173. Mittenthal, supra note 158, at 40-41. Compare Restatement, supra note 50, at
S 203(b) ("express terms are given greater weight than course of performance, course
dealing, and usage of trade").
174. See, e.g., Hercules Products, Inc., 81 LA 191, 193 (Goodman 1983) ("It is also
generally accepted in arbitration that the parties by their actions effectively modified
the written agreement by their actions in a binding past practice.", Louisiana-Pacific
Corp., 79 LA 658, 664 (Eaton 1982) ("Normally, the intent is best and most clearly ex-
pressed in the written collective bargaining agreement. However, it is clear that in other
cases ... it may be equally clearly expressed by actions."). See also Braniff Airways, Inc.,
79 LA 383, 389 (Sisk 1982); Metropolitan Coach Lines, 27 LA 376, 383 (Lennard 1956);
Smith Display Service, 17 LA 524, 526 (Sherbow 1951); Loveless v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 681 F.2d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 1982) (Absent some express restriction upon the ar-
bitrator's authority, the arbitrator is not limited to the bare words of the agreement
and common law rules for the interpretation of private contracts."). See also, Aaron, Use
of the Past in Arbitration, Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Meeting, National Academy
of Arbitrators 1, 3-6 (1955).
175. Farrell Lines, Inc., 86 LA 36, 39 (Hockenberry 1986) (such conduct must be
unequivocal, clearly acted upon and readily ascertainable over a reasonable period of time);
Federal Mogul Corp., 86 LA 225, 230 (Blinn 1985); Ford Motor Co., 83-1 ARB 1 8075 (Roumell
1983). Cf. Hussman Corp., 84 LA at 142 (in order to modify the plain language of the
contract, the evidence of a past practice must be exceedingly strong, frequent and con-
stant in order to infer that the parties intended to change the contract specifically and
by mutual agreement).
176. Cf. Wallen, The Silent Contract vs. Express Provisions: The Arbitration of Local
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In Mid-America Canning Corp.7 ' the arbitrator reasoned:
During collective bargaining the parties to the process often
spend considerable time negotiating over specific language. In
some cases what is agreed to is clear and unambiguous in mean-
ing. In other cases the language is purposely vague in order to
provide flexibility in application. In constructing [sic] language
it is not always possible to know what situations will arise that
could lead to dispute over the intent and application of language.
The real meaning of language is determined by how it is applied
on a day-to-day basis. In some instances consistent past practice
can provide an entirely different meaning to what appears in
the agreement to be clear and unambiguous.'78
This view is in accord with the basic principle of contract law that
parties can amend an earlier agreement by later conduct, so long as
it is not in conflict with an agreed upon and operative mechanism for
amendment of the contract.'79
F. Employer Handbooks
Generally, manuals and handbooks unilaterally established by an
employer are not binding upon the union." However, a procedure
unilaterally put in effect through an employer's handbook and unchal-
lenged by the union for a substantial period of time should not be ig-
nored in determining the meaning of contract terms.8 '
G. External Law
Arbitrators frequently look to external law for help in construing
Working Conditions, Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting, National Academy of
Arbitrators 117, 121 (1962).
177. 85 LA 900 (Imundo 1985).
178. Id. at 904 (parties interpreted the words "calendar year" to mean "anniver-
sary year").
179. Jones, Problems of Proof in the Arbitration Process: Report of the West Coast
Tripartite Committee, Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting, National Academy
of Arbitrators 149, 185 (1967). See Levi Strauss & Co., 69 LA 1, 6 (Goodstein 1977); Keene
Corp., 63 LA 169, 170-71 (Williams undated); Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 61 LA 703,
706 (Sembower 1973).
180. Hughes Airwest, 71 LA 1123, 1125 (Roberts 1978) (any conflict between com-
pany manual and collective bargaining agreement must be resolved pursuant to express
provisions of collective bargaining agreement). See Grier Steel Co., 50 LA 340, 343 (McIntosh
1968); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 45 LA 131, 140 (Hebert 1965). But see United Furniture
Workers v. Virco Mfg. Co., 257 F. Supp. 138, 143 (E. D. Ark. 1962) (contract included
unilaterally promulgated pamphlets and bulletins).
181. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 85 LA 669, 673 (Duff 1985) (a procedure in fre-
quent use unchallenged for nearly ten years cannot be ignored).
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contract language.'82 If the parties have chosen to incorporate external
law into their agreement, the arbitrator must interpret and apply that
law." Separability or savings clauses have sometimes been construed
as indicating an intent that the parties expect the contract to be con-
strued consistently with "external law" and "public policy."'"
It has been asserted that, even in the absence of incorporation of
external law into the contract, an arbitrator must consider external law
in construing a collective bargaining agreement.'85 Others have taken
the position that it is appropriate for an arbitrator to consider external
law only in construing a contract where a contract provision is found
to be ambiguous and one of the reasonable interpretations would be
unlawful.'" According to Arbitrator Mittenthal, while an arbitrator's
award may permit conduct prohibited by law, it should not require con-
duct forbidden by law.'87
Frequently state or federal employment discrimination laws are con-
sidered in construing nondiscrimination clauses in collective bargaining
agreements.'"
G. Industry Practice
Industry custom and practice may aid in determining the intended
meaning of a contract provision.8 ' Where the same agreement has been
182. See, e.g., Container Corp. of America, 84 LA 489, 494 (Nicholas 1985) (arbitrator
relied upon NLRB and court decisions in determining the meaning of "supervisor"); Ser-
vice Care, Inc., 84 LA 736, 737 (Duff 1985) (every collective bargaining agreement should
be interpreted in harmony with the national labor policy established by Congress). See
supra text accompanying note 86.
183. Zack & Bloch, supra note 4, at 28-29. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp., 86
LA 805, 808 (Beilstein 1986) (determining what payments were "required by law").
184. See, e.g., Lakeville Community Schools, 85 LA 945, 948-49 (Grinstead 1985). See
also Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual
Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 42, 49 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Mittenthal,
The Role of Law].
185. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB and the Courts, Proceedings of the Twen-
tieth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 67, 87 (1967). But see Meltzer,
Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, Proceedings of the Twentieth
Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 1, 16-17 (1967) ("Where ... there is
an irrepressible conflict, the abitrator ... should respect the agreement and ignore the
law.") [hereinafter cited as Meltzer].
186. Meltzer, supra note 185, at 15-16.
187. Mittenthal, The Role of Law, supra note 184, at 50.
188. See, e.g., City of Grand Rapids, 86 LA 819 (Frost 1986); Naval Ordinance Sta-
tion, 81-1 ARB 8239 (Dunsford 1981); Hurley Hosp., 70 LA 1061, 1062-63 (Roumell 1978)
("When parties use a phrase such as 'discrimination as to ... creed,' they presumably
are incorporating the applicable law on that subject into their contract.").
189. Restatement, supra note 50, at S 222. See also id. at S 203(b) ("[EJxpress terms
are given greater weight than ... usage of trade, course of performance is given greater
weight than ... usage of trade ....").
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entered into by other employers or unions, the interpretation of those
agreements by the other employers or unions may provide persuasive
evidence of the meaning of the common language." ®
190. See ITT-Continental Baking Co., 74 LA 92, 95 (Ross 1980); Furr's Inc., 71 LA
233, 237 (Finston 1978): Durkee-Atwood Co., 70 LA 765, 766 (Grabb 1978).
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